The no-fly zone element of the UN Security Council Resolution (1973) has garnered most attention but “all necessary measures” (to protect civilians in Libya) terminology is the key enabling language that translates this into effectively a declaration of war against Gaddafi. This provides this alliance of the willing with a carte blanche as to time, means and place (target). This will in end be more about air or other (drone, Cruise etc) strikes rather than mere enforcement of a no-fly zone. Even pretext is not particularly difficult to fashion. The justification for military action under this Resolution (1973) already exists on the basis of Gaddafi’s already elaborated violations of international humanitarian law (mentioned in Resolution 1970 – adopted on February 26, 2011). Now, the situation in Libya can be seen as emulating the closing weeks of the conflict (and genocide) in Bosnia & Herzegovina (BiH) in the fall of 1995, and it is reasonable to consider that valuable lessons have been learned regarding the cost of inaction as well as the price of more direct confrontation/intervention. In a month or so, the UN Security Council, or more accurately, the big western powers have ascended what took them over three 3 years to resolutely address in BiH. The wasting of civilian life, the close quarters dancing with despots as Slobodan Milosevic, the entrenchment of extremism and the loss of credibility where all unnecessary consequences of the evasions, delays and duplicity that may have seemed clever at the outset of the conflict in BiH, but in the end left a terrible cost to be paid by the citizens of BiH (even today), but also the Euro-Atlantic alliance. With the above in mind, why did official Washington decide to move ahead now, after so much hesitation from some quarters, particularly the Pentagon? • Gaddafi’s forces were effectively exploiting their air and others weapon to squash opposition and end any realistic alternative to Gaddafi’s regime, (as was the case with Saddam Hussein, at the end of first Gulf War- Ironically, it may have been Gaddafi’s own recent boasts that he would squash the opposition that hastened adoption of this new resolution). • The endorsement of the Arab League, Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) was welcome by many in Washington, but it also was a challenge to the Obama Administrations credibility, to take credible action - as well as leadership. • The British and French leadership in drafting this Resolution and urgently seeking military options left the US also at risk in terms of its leadership role within Euro-Atlantic alliance. • Oil cannot begin to flow again as long as Gaddafi remains – (as foreign workers will not return to Libya to help run petroleum industry). • This also leaves potential vacuum, (with Washington and Western/Arab Allies seeing options evaporate and also open door that unresolved situation is exploited by Beijing, Moscow or even a Hugo Chavez). • How much the human rights abuses and suffering actually are a motivation (as compared to petroleum or despise for Gaddafi), we will never really know; however such provides an impetus and/or pretext, depending on your view. (My guess is that Washington, London or Paris are not particularly settled as to how much they are motivated by humanitarian or even ideological considerations versus petroleum, and are not particularly troubled by such ambiguity). The commitment of Arab aircraft/forces (reportedly including Egypt, Jordan, Qatar and Saudi Arabia) provides significant assets and logistics support. It provides the Pentagon with a welcome opportunity to rejuvenate such old alliances recently strained by other considerations from perceived Israeli intransigence to Arab “revolutions,” not to mention the Iraq clumsiness. Whatever analysts may want to read into this Resolution to define limitations that it may impose on this anti-Gaddafi alliance, this Alliance will in fact interpret Resolution 1973 as it feels necessary to get the job done, to get rid of Gaddafi and certainly not just to enforce the no-fly zone or to protect civilians. Another lesson of Bosnia is that when there is a will, anything can be redefined to authorize the necessary action – the broad use of NATO air power to compel Milosevic and Mladic into submission. On the other hand, if authority and thus responsibility is evaded, then the result is an extended war with ever growing costs and infamous events as Srebrenica – the murder of thousands despite mandated protection under UN “safe area” and NATO “protected zones.” This time around, I do not only expect that authority will be exercised expansively pursuant to Resolution 1973, but that it will be Gaddafi who will have to seek a safe haven – or perhaps it is too late, (as it was for Mussolini to save himself from his own people even as Hitler offered him a momentary reprieve). Outcome decided, and it is only now a matter of time, place and Gaddafi will have little influence into the means of his own demise. By Ambassador Muhamed Sacirbey www.diplomaticallyincorrect.org Facebook – “Diplomatically Incorrect” Twitter – DiplomaticallyX Related Reports: “Arab Revolutions How Far?” diplomaticallyincorrect.org/films/blog_post/arab-revolutions-how-far-by-ambassador-mo/25222 “No-Fly Zone Over Libya?” diplomaticallyincorrect.org/films/blog_post/no-fly-zone-over-libya-un-nato-washington-debates-by-ambassador-mo/25596