When Germany abstained on vote for Resolution 1973 by which UN Security Council authorized “all necessary measures” to confront Colonel Gaddafi’s rampage against rebels and civilians, it lost on several levels. The vote of 10 in favor and 5 abstentions (with Germany joining the 4 of China, Russia, India and Brazil) left it effectively isolated from NATO-EU allies: the United States, United Kingdom, France and Portugal (not to mention Bosnia & Herzegovina as aspirant to both institutions that also voted in favor). Of course, one can argue that Germany was attempting to be principled by rejecting military action of any sort. However, that is difficult to reconcile with Germany’s enthusiastic vote in favor of Resolution 1970 only a couple of weeks earlier – by which purported grave violations of international humanitarian law in Libya by Gaddafi’s military were referred to the International Criminal Court. If you recognize crimes being committed in violation of international law don’t you have an affirmative obligation to confront such , at least if the capacity exists? It is of dubious value to victims to condemn what is being done to them but then remain as an observer to such violations if the abuses and killings continue. No one demanded that Germany become directly involved militarily, but when others including long time allies as the United Kingdom, France and the United States were willing to take on the task, how did Germany come to conclusion that it would opt to effectively deny support for allied intervention that was likely to be seen by Gaddafi as an opportunity to continue. Weighing risks, which did Berlin believe was more tangible and greater. Dangers of Inaction More Tangible than Potential Risks of Intervention: The evident, tangible danger of inaction to Libyan civilians and to the credibility of the UN Security Council outweighed the more ethereal risks that any intervention is likely to reveal. It is part of the responsibility of UN Security Council members, particularly the Permanent Members - and those with aspirations for such status - to have to make a choice between bad and worse options. It should also be highlighted that once the UN Security Council, including Germany, voted to impose various sanctions against Gaddafi and his Libyan regime, intervention was already being initiated. The subsequent Resolution 1973 authorizing all necessary measures was following up and a logical next step if the first measure did not produce the desired result, at least a cease fire. And What About Germany’s Aspirations for a Permanent Seat on the UN Security Council? That is now a more distant possibility. Germany went against the stated calls of the Arab League, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and the Organization of the Islamic Conference and an overwhelming majority of UN members. In my interaction with many Ambassadors/diplomats at the UN, overwhelmingly there was an opinion that Gaddafi had gone overboard, by his government’s actions and in his irrational behavior. Further, while humanitarian intervention was the label, it was understood by all that the objective was Gaddafi’s removal, for almost everyone’s sake. Of course, no resolution could directly assert such a point, at least not until Gaddafi is indicted by the ICC. While some capitals with perhaps dubious human rights’ records may appreciate Berlin’s overstated reserve toward military intervention, the abstention highlighted Germany’s unpreparedness to be proactive in the Security Council’s main mandate: addressing “threats to international peace and security.” Rationalizing such relative over caution by references to Germany’s historical militarism only could highlight Germany’s potential unsuitability, regardless of validity of such perception. Germany’s Leadership Within EU: Germany will continue to lead Europe economically and probably will have to bear a substantial chunk of the price tag, at least indirectly. Within the EU and NATO there was a general inclination toward action (with Turkey having some ambivalence for a variety of reasons more direct to its interests). Germany broke a rather hard rule that dictated that EU states take a unified position on votes before the UN, particularly the Security Council. (This was frequently an issue regarding the “Bosnian conflict” when some European states indicated an inclination to split, but were pressured into consensus that became inertia toward inaction). More likely consequence of Germany’s abstention is that Paris and London will be able to reassert their unique role as foreign policy trendsetters. Of course, they still have to deal with Germany as Europe’s economic engine; however now they can also forward the bill to Berlin. (because they have to assume more to be Europe’s de-facto military/rapid deployment force, Germany should pay a higher share to cover the cost of European defense leadership on global level) Is Berlin’s Relationship with Washington Invariably Damaged? Undoubtedly the US will have to review a decades old trend favoring Germany’s rehabilitation at global level and within NATO as military and political factor. Recall, that voting for Resolution 1973 did not mean that Germany had to commit military forces. Washington also does not like to be disappointed – just ask Sarajevo and Lisbon – who both fell in line once the Obama Administration decided it actually wanted intervention in Libya. Then, there is the quaint rumor that Germany was inclined to nurture its special relationship with Moscow employing an abstention to show solidarity with Russia’s ambivalence. However, if a Permanent UN Security Council seat is at stake, it is now Washington that is more likely to remember this slight or at least split while Russia might not be able or willing to move forward Berlin’s ambition anyway. Germany’s Abstention – Deferring to Muslim Sensibilities or Another Promotion of Separation of Civilizations? Germany Chancellor Angela Merkel has voiced views that follow an increasing trend to paint Europe as a Christian continent and that project Islam and multiculturalism as alien to Germany. How this all in the end stirs and comes out, remains to be seen. However, Berlin’s abstention is less likely to be perceived as deferring to Muslim sensibilities and more as another cornerstone of policy increasingly promoting separation of civilizations. Bosnia & Herzegovina Facing Dilemma: The Bosnia & Herzegovina vote in favor by no means was not a forgone conclusion. There are many economic/corporate interests that have benefited recently from relationships with Tripoli, and this is the case for many enterprises in the former Yugoslavia. Notably though Gaddafi’s Government was not particularly helpful to Bosnia & Herzegovina during the 1990’s conflict. On the other hand, from mercenaries to weapons, Gaddafi had established close functional cooperation with various more nationalist Serbian element/governments. In end though, particularly for so many who suffered under the siege and shelling of almost 2 decades earlier, the vote in favor of “all necessary measures” was a moral imperative, (at least for most Bosniak/Bosnian Muslim political leaders including Member of the Presidency Bakir Izetbegovic). From Personal Experience: In the summer of 1992, as evidence of ethnic cleansing and other war crimes/abuses came to light in global media, the UN Security Council adopted a series of Presidential Statements and Resolutions holding out the possibility of establishing an international criminal tribunal to bring the responsible perpetrators to justice. By no means was the establishment of the “Yugoslav War Crimes Tribunal” (ICTY) a certainty. In fact as Bosnia’s Ambassador involved in the debates at the UN, I came to see that the promise of judgment before a war crimes tribunal at some time in the future being held out as an alternative to actual measures that would confront the perpetrators (Milosevic, Mladic, Karadzic) and stop the crimes from continuing. Bosnians/Herzegovinians kept hearing all the right language about the rule of law, antipathy toward the perpetrators and sympathy for the victims. In the meantime, inaction accessorized by mere words resulted in thousands more victims over that period and a morally corrupt and non-functional political system fashioned by the very individuals ultimately indicted by the ICTY, but only after the villains accomplished their goals. Germany should not have overlooked this historical lesson in which it had a defining role as 1 of 5 of the Contact Group on Bosnia & Herzegovina in the mid-1990’s. The rule of law demands action and not just mere judgment, lest inaction metastasizes into acquiescence or at least responsibility in not confronting the perpetrator while the crime continues – an indictment which very well may be appropriate in the precedent of Bosnia. Preemptive war is potentially criminally culpable while preventive measures to protect victims may be an imperative when deterrence based on threats of prosecution has not stopped the commission of the crime already underway.By my count, Gaddafi is the biggest loser and Berlin has made the greatest miscalculation in the voting on UN Security Council Resolution 1973. By Ambassador Muhamed Sacirbey Face Book at “Diplomatically Incorrect” Twitter – DiplomaticallyX More related Reports at News & Videos – www.diplomaticallyincorrect.org including: International Criminal Court Game Changer, by Ambassador mo Libyan Diplomats Accuse Their Own Government of War Crimes & Call for UN Security Council to Act, by Ambassador mo Shutting Down War Crimes Tribunal Prematurely? by Ambassador mo