Looking Back Upon Richard Holbrooke's Diplomacy & Forward to Future of Bosnia, by Susan
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Below is article from Adam Le Bor written for The Economist upon the unexpected passing of Richard Holbrooke. It is another view, which in the end may both complement and differ from perspectives many Bosnians/Herzegovinians may hold of Mr. Holbrooke. After all, they have had one of the longest relationships with not the man or even diplomat, but the results of his design before, during and after the Dayton Accords. Muhamed Sacirbey has been very direct, and certainly critical upon occasion, about events that Mr. Holbrooke had a direct role in, from the non-arrest of Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, lost opportunities to confront and perhaps hasten the demise of Slobodan Milosevic's regime to the still unexplained failure to confront Serbian forces in Srebrenica.
Whether the betrayal of Srebrenica is due to a conspiracy, mentioned below in Mr. Le Bor's article and citing Mr. Holbrooke:
--"Mr. Holbrooke also claimed that Britain, France and the Netherlands had cut a deal with Ratko Mladic, the Bosnian Serb military leader, to veto any NATO air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs until the Dutch peacekeepers had been evacuated from Srebrenica in July 1995, just before the Serbs massacred up to 8,000 Muslim men and boys."--
In a recent interview with David Harland, then UN official in the former Yugoslavia and subsequently leading inquiry and authoring UN General Assembly mandated "Srebrenica Report," Mr. Harland asserts that the Dutch peacekeepers on at least 5 occasions preceding Mladic's entry into Srebrenica,called for NATO air support. As we all know, but for reasons never explained, those decisive NATO air strikes never claims for reasons that even Mr. Harland states he does not know. (See video interview below). Muhamed Sacirbey has been abundantly transparent regarding both the evidence and his suspicions for the "betrayal of Srebrenica, including Mr. Holbrooke's apparent role. As Mr. Le Bor's book title suggests, "Complicity with Evil" someone had to be complicit or acquiescent to the betrayal of Srebrenica and thus the consequence of the genocide, foreseen or not. Mr. Le Bor is absolutely correct that: Mr. Holbrooke will be missed, not least by future generations of historians on the Balkans..." It is also most fair to now remind that while Mr. Holbrooke's legacy is being crafted in epithets, it is still the future of Bosnia & Herzegovina that is most in need of enlightenment.
Richard Holbrooke, Rest in Peace;
Bosnia & Herzegovina, may your future be more blessed.
by Susan Sacirbey
"Cover Up Re Srebrenica," (BBC): diplomaticallyincorrect.org/films/movie/ambassador-muhamed-sacirbey-on-betrayal-cover-up-regarding-srebrenica-genocide/17916
"New Inquiry on Srebrenica Genocide -David Harland interview" diplomaticallyincorrect.org/films/movie/new-inquiry-on-srebrenica-genocide/19068
"Betrayal to Genocide at Srebrenica" diplomaticallyincorrect.org/films/movie/betrayal-to-genocide-at-srebrenica-sylvie-matton-french-investigative-author/21503 ;
From The Economist, by Adam Le Bor: www.economist.com/blogs/easternapproaches/2010/12/richard_holbrooke
WE know well what Richard Holbrooke, the American diplomat who died yesterday, did during his long career at the centre of US foreign policy-making. Among many other achievements and roles, he engineered the signing of the 1995 Dayton peace accords that ended the Bosnian war, and served as President Obama’s envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan.
But Mr Holbrooke was just as passionate about what he did not do. In the Balkans in the 1990s, and more recently in south Asia—he had to deal with some very unsavoury characters. Any suggestion that he had crossed the line and become too friendly with his negotiating partners, or had offered any sort of secret deal, brought forth furious denials. In 2005 I interviewed Holbrooke in New York for my book "Complicity with Evil", a study of the UN and genocide. We spoke about the Dayton negotiations. “Milosevic was in my mind a thug," said Mr Holbrooke. "He was not then a war criminal. Otherwise we wouldn’t have negotiated with him."
He also angrily rejected claims that he had become too chummy with the Serbian leader. Unlike other "well-intentioned negotiators, including a lot of Americans", he thundered, "I never mixed it up with Milosevic. I never drank with him. I never fell into any familiarity with him except in pursuit of the broader objective."
Ten years after Dayton, Mr Holbrooke remained intensely proud of the agreement. But he also reflected on its flaws. "We shouldn’t have allowed three armies to continue. We should have made the central government stronger. We should have created a truth and reconciliation commission."
Mr Holbrooke also claimed that Britain, France and the Netherlands had cut a deal with General Ratko Mladic, the Bosnian Serb military leader, to veto any NATO air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs until the Dutch peacekeepers had been evacuated from Srebrenica in July 1995, just before the Serbs massacred up to 8,000 Muslim men and boys:
"I believed then, and I am certain now, that had we bombed, the whole thing would have stopped immediately. They were street bullies, thugs, an absolute rabble. Somehow, the greatest democracies, with the most powerful arsenal, the most powerful countries in the world and the greatest military alliance, was scared of Mladic, whose idea of military combat is to slit a pig's throat in front of a pathetic Dutch colonel."
We last spoke in the summer of 2008, when Radovan Karadzic, wartime leader of the Bosnian Serbs, was was found in Belgrade, living under a false name and working as a spiritual healer, and arrested. Like any Balkan aficionado, Mr Holbrooke relished these bizarre circumstances.
As the story broke, Mohammad Sacirbey, a former Bosnian ambassador to the UN, told me that US officials had agreed with Mr Karadzic in 1996 that if he quit active politics he would not be arrested. I wanted to check this claim with Mr Holbrooke, and so I emailed his office in New York. He was a busy man and usually not easy to get hold of. Nevertheless, a few minutes later he called me from a lift in the US Senate. Needless to say, he dismissed Mr Sacirbey’s claims as "grotesque disinformation".
Mr Holbrooke will be missed, not least by future generations of historians of the Balkans, who have been deprived of a valuable and sometimes wonderfully indiscreet source.