Winning shootouts does not translate into winning the war – just ask the Soviets. Anniversary of 10 years of conflict passed in low-key fashion, in part because there is so little to see on the ground as sustainable success. What we don’t see is probably the war’s biggest accomplishment – pushing Al-Qaeda and the Taliban at least out of the formal institutions of the central state. However, that was done in the first few months and mostly by Afghan opposition on the ground and US/NATO in the air. Most of the last 10 years has been undefined by clear objectives or lasting accomplishments. Restoring Rather than Introducing Progress: Afghanistan needs a transformation. However, is combat led by US and western forces best way to realize change? The Arab revolutions have evidenced that change can come from within. And Afghanistan actually has experienced independence longer than most of its neighbors including India and Pakistan. It was a society more open to women’s opportunities and rights, only a few decades earlier under the previous king before the Soviet occupation. (PHOTO Above – Read: “New Generation of Afghan Women-Law Enforcement: diplomaticallyincorrect.org/films/blog_post/new-generation-of-afghan-women-law-enforcement-by-ambassador-mo/28661 ). Contrary to the popular narrative, it is not about introducing women’s rights, tolerance and greater openness but as much about restoring. (See FILM REPORT – “Afghan Women Regaining Rightful Role - diplomaticallyincorrect.org/films/movie/afghan-women-regaining-rightful-role/25719 ) Is Progressive Afghanistan to be Dealt Away in “Deal” with Taliban? However, it appears that the mission in Afghanistan is being scaled down one progressive objective after another, (including women’s role in society, economy and government - to extent that is still in agenda, UN mission has assumed much of role). Most has been put on the table to be given away as part of any negotiated deal with the new/old Taliban. Women, education and even democracy would appear to be at risk as bargaining chips, and the Taliban do not particularly look keen on making a deal as much as exposing western intervention forces as transient and unworthy allies to the values and political forces that they promote. Many Afghan leaders are hedging their bets seeing US/NATO withdrawal coming later or more likely sooner. Drones & Males: Relying upon young Americans, mostly males, barely or not yet out of their teens to shoot at people they have never seen before or much understand linguistically or culturally produces little tangible benefit to either Afghanistan or US. (Taliban recruit similar demographics for their foot soldiers- See Top Photo). It is not more effective in winning minds and hearts when “drone” planes are operated from bases in Nevada by people who actually go home after playing what looks very similar to video games. It is safer for US soldiers of course, but nonetheless several thousand allied soldiers have been killed and many more maimed/wounded. The Afghan casualties are much greater. The “Outsider” Becomes the Occupier - Combat “Success” May Breed More Allied Casualties in Future: Particularly destructive, in terms of actual lives lost and confidence/support eroded are the “mistaken” civilian targets, most frequently inflicted from the air by manned and unmanned aircraft (problems appears to have been worse prior to last year). From US/NATO/UN –Kabul central government perspective, regardless of whose fault, civilians and allied Afghan troops targeted “mistakenly,” this lays the foundation for resentment, mistrust, intensified insurgency and ultimately more US and NATO lives lost (than might have been saved by any combat support mission that caused such civilian casualties in first place). Fault and circumstances become irrelevant. Inevitably the “outsider” gets the blame, and the longer he stays the more he is perceived as intruder pursuing his own agenda in your country – the definition of occupier, again rightfully or not and regardless of intent. Once started, it is difficult if not impossible to reverse. It is a vicious cycle, or to transfer a current term from finance, contagion. (See FILM Report – “What About Civilian Casualties?” diplomaticallyincorrect.org/films/movie/what-about-afghan-civilian-casualties/25888 ). What is Objective? Again, this is a problem that I do not have a solution for now. Mission went wrong somewhere along the way – especially when combat became an end unto itself. Particularly women and more progressive institutions/individuals are reluctant to see the US/NATO/UN leave, fearing the alternative of the Taliban reclaiming authority over all the country including urban centers. To what extent though is the US/NATO/UN mission defined by concrete social/economic goals for benefit of advancing/restoring Afghanistan? Has the real objective been reduced to simply whoever is left in charge in Kabul promising not to allow the country to be used as a base for terror in the future? Even if the promise is forthcoming, how to enforce it? More relevantly, are we (US/NATO/UN) now doing more in sowing seeds for future generations of disaffected and angry rather than establishing a credible partner? Making Retreat Look Like Mission Accomplished? Most military officials in Washington, Brussels and UN HQ in NY claim that the war in Afghanistan is making progress. Looked at from perspective of military engagements, that may be the snapshot but most of us have seen this film before including Vietnam. I suspect that at least some are thinking more in terms establishing the foundation for the withdrawal schedule in order not to have it appear as a retreat. During a recent conversation with an old friend and Washington insider, he told me “you know Holbrooke failed in Afghanistan/Pakistan?” The US spent several years trying to make Vietnam not appear as a retreat – only to be exposed as Saigon fell. Holbrooke also was part of that diplomatic endeavor. (The Dayton Accords unfortunately also look like surrender to ethnic chauvinism and politics as well as genocide). Orderly Retreat? 10 years after, that may be the best of the worst outcomes possible. However, it appears like a huge investment in precious human life and valuable resources – several billion a month, to effect a cosmetic impression not even permanent change, (and more like botox rather than plastic nip and tuck, as the erasing of wrinkles is only temporary). Time to have a fundamental rethink. Perhaps the money can be better spent and lives saved by converting Afghanistan from combat mission into something that has a better opportunity for progressing Afghanistan (rather than merely redefining and reducing expectations of mission so that what ever the result, it can be labeled as “mission accomplished). Is Afghanistan worse now than 10 years earlier? Depends on the perspective, the measurement and expectations. There are successes, but is it enough or sustainable? (FILM REPORT – “Mayor of Kabul –NATO Report” - diplomaticallyincorrect.org/films/movie/the-mayor-of-kabul-with-voiceover/28707 ). However, Pakistan is undoubtedly in a more precarious position, as are US-Pakistani relations. How does Afghanistan fit into US/NATO/UN role in the much greater transformations now underway through much of the bigger neighborhood – from Islamic majority countries to rise of China? FILM REPORT –“UN Security Council: Taliban Reality?” - diplomaticallyincorrect.org/films/movie/taliban-reality/27436 FILM REPORT – “Face That Kills for God” - diplomaticallyincorrect.org/films/movie/face-that-kills-for-god/26283 By Ambassador Muhamed Sacirbey Facebook – Become a Fan at “Diplomatically Incorrect” Twitter – Follow us on DiplomaticallyX “Pakistan” (Afghanistan) Channel - diplomaticallyincorrect.org/c/pakistan