Speaking against the perpetuation of Republika Srpska (RS) while continuing to embrace the Dayton Accords is neither consistent nor sincere political position. It may be convenient though - one can spew rhetorically to the RS’s continuing toxic effect on Bosnia & Herzegovina’s (BiH) pluralistic fabric as well as state functionality - while also avoid offending official Washington and much of Europe (which cling to the Dayton Accords as a historical trophy and the legitimizing of their historical role during the recent conflict). "The Secret History of Dayton" However, a reading of the “official” recoding of events during and leading up to the Dayton Accords evidences how intricately the Dayton Accords and Republika Srpska were linked by not only Slobodan Milosevic but European and particularly US officials, such as Richard Holbrooke, who excitedly assumed the role of initiator. “The Secret History of Dayton” a US State Department sponsored narration was not available for my review until 2005. It does portray the role of US officials in the most favorable light, as might be expected. Certain US officials are painted to be simultaneously the most clever and chaste. Regardless, the information outlined can be frequently revealing, something not known to us or media at the time, even if there are some areas that reflect probably overt avoidance as well as a few mistakes. "Browbeating" Izetbegovic - Not Calling Milosevic's "Bluff" “Republika Srpska” was pressed upon the Republic of Bosnia & Herzegovina (RBiH) delegation in Ankara in early September 1995 after the NATO air strikes had already been initiated but Holbrooke had paused them. From the “Secret History of Dayton”: “Any entity’s name didn’t matter, they (Richard Holbrooke and legal Adviser Roberts Owen) argued; what mattered was the political and legal structures it adhered to. They battled with Izetbegovic on this point, ‘browbeating’ him as one delegate member later recalled. Owen was sympathetic to the Bosnian President’s concerns but could not see how they could tell the Serbs what to call themselves. Milosevic had demanded ‘Republika Srpska’ as a price for his agreement and the US negotiators preferred not to call his bluff. Later that night, after a great deal of pressure, the Bosnian President finally agreed. A fundamental pillar of eventual agreement (in Dayton) had fallen into place.” – (Page 90) Resisting Successfully the term "Republika Srpska" at United Nations That evening, I had also been in Ankara. Unfortunately by their design or coincidence, I was at meetings with Turkish and American officials. (It was an official visit to Turkey’s Government addressing many issues of multilateral and bilateral consideration.) I was not with President Izetbegovic to help resist the “browbeating.” In NY during my tenure as RBiH Ambassador there were endless efforts to inject the term “Republika Srpska” into official language and legitimize the RS (while at the same time marginalizing the legitimacy of RBiH.) We had been successful in large part due to our persistence as much as our legal education and understanding the consequences. By Milosevic's terms - "Subterfuge" as Tactic I had come to be increasingly suspicious of not only official Washington’s designs in reaching an end to war at any cost including playing by Milosevic’s terms, (from my various contacts in the Clinton Administration -- Albright to Kruzel who was sadly killed on Igman just days earlier) I was even more mistrustful of Holbrooke’s willingness to go beyond the norm of what I would expect of an American in substance or method. I cannot confirm that my absence that evening in Ankara was subterfuge, but I did then understand that there was a three way game of poker –Milosevic, Holbrooke and Izetbegovic. I’m not certain how much President Izetbegovic understood this or the game, and that is why on every key hand Holbrooke would choose to try to bluff Izetbegovic and why he did not “call Milosevic’s bluff.” (See story of Holbrooke’s “bluff” regarding RBiH offensive to retake Banja Luka/Prijedor - bosniatv.org/films/movie/fruits-of-genocide-srebrenica-to-prijedor/20091). Poker with Milosevic - Calling his Bluff It was possible to prevail against Milosevic’s play of his hand and bluff. A few days earlier in Zagreb, (September 1, 1995), while confronting Holbrooke on his endorsement of a pause in NATO strikes, at Milosevic’s request, before the siege of Sarajevo had been lifted, we worked on the foundations that would be the basis for the “American Initiative” and the Dayton Accords. Republika Srpska was not mentioned, but I had found other troubling signs of Milosevic’s influence and strategy. Here is how it is described in “The Secret History of Dayton”: “While Clark and Pardew briefed the NAC, Holbrooke returned to their hotel to join Owen, Hill and Sacirbey to continue work on the draft principles for Geneva. Sacirbey remained angry about the bombing pause, arguing that it was inappropriate to give the Serbs any more time to comply with Janvier’s terms. On the draft principles, the Bosnian foreign minister disagreed with the notion that each Bosnian entity have the right to maintain cultural and economic ties with other countries. He correctly identified this as a Milosevic addition, pointing out that such arrangements would allow for the eventual dissolution of Bosnia. He asked that language be added to guarantee that such ties be consistent with Bosnia’s integrity and sovereignty.” (Page 87) Faced with the changes that I had proposed to Holbrooke and Team, Milosevic at first acted confused and then reacted angrily. Again from “The Secret History of Dayton.” “Their discussion with Milosevic – which Holbrooke joined midway after arriving from his OIC talks in Geneva – were on the new language about the integrity of Bosnia and possible ‘special ties’ between Serbia and Srpska negotiated with Sacirbey. Milosevic acted confused about the rationale for the additions. When the team explained that the new language aimed to prevent secession, he claimed that such a line was unnecessary. Milosevic tried to convince the US that there was no issue; he would never allow a Serb entity to secede, therefore there was no need to even acknowledge the possibility. He claimed that to imply that he would allow secession by including his language would sully his honor. Owen and others did not accept his point, and reluctantly, Milosevic finally accepted the changes.” (Page 88) NATO Air Strikes to Lift 1,000 Day Siege of Sarajevo As noted in the US delegations language, my focus was on the restarting the NATO air strikes until Sarajevo’s siege by Mladic was ended. Holbrooke had endorsed what he first described as a “24 hour pause” mostly to impress upon not only the Serbians and Bosnians but also the Europeans and even his Washington colleagues how he controlled the trigger for military action. “Sacirbey had again expressed this anger to Deputy Secretary Talbott in a phone call (prior to Sacirbey’s meeting with Holbrooke that day [in Zagreb], where the Bosnian minister said that ‘the GOBiH is concerned the air strike pause signifies a pull-back in NATO determination to press the Serbs.” (Page 87 - Footnote 64). Frankly, from the outset I saw it at least in part as Holbrooke’s ego and from long experience was very concerned that Holbrooke’s egotism would lose the opportunity for Sarajevo to be liberated after more than 1,000 days of siege: As “The Secret History of Dayton” details, “24 had become 72 hours.” Mladic had no intention of giving up the siege as now also understood by US officials: “it was soon determined that they (Mladic) had only moved weapons around, refusing to ‘withdraw’ them from the exclusion zone around Sarajevo.” (Page 85) Worse, Mladic saw the pause as a sign of weakness and disunity by the Allies and an opportunity to press for the final division of Sarajevo. As the US Embassy in Sarajevo observed: “Characterizing Mladic’s letter, the US Embassy in Sarajevo observed that ‘in essence Mladic is prepared to accept the West’s surrender. He freezes the lines, keeps his gains, strangles Sarajevo, continues to harass the UN with license, renegotiates the airport deal, reduces the exclusion zone to a tiny safe area (Pale remains exempt), and reserves the right to launch offensive operations. This letter (Mladic’s in response to Janvier and NATO bomb pause) is an outrage, as a senior UN official put it. But it will become a crime if the UN accepts it.” (Page 85 – Footnote 50) “In his September 1 conversation with Sacirbey, Talbott said the BSA was not withdrawing its weapons, and that if this continued, NATO was prepared to resume strikes.” (Page 85 – Footnote 49) Holbrooke's "Gamble" Fails - To Brussels to Resume NATO Strikes The problem was though that there was much disagreement on resuming NATO air action. “Holbrooke realized that the calculated gamble had come up short. “ (Page 85) However, there was opposition from not only Janvier, some members of the North Atlantic Council (NATO Representatives), but even some US military. My fears were coming true. From Ankara, I flew immediately to NATO HQ in Brussels. It was late Sunday night, but Mirsada Colakovic, the junior BiH officer on duty at our Embassy secured that I meet with NATO Secretary General Willy Claes. The NATO Secretary General had just returned from his country home, and it was 10PM. After our conversation, he assured me that he would restart the NATO air strikes. A few hours later, reports reached me that NATO had resumed action. Pressing Trade of Gorazde & "Deal" with Milosevic/Mladic? There was one other element of Holbrooke’s demands that had been troubling me from the outset of his “peace initiative.” When I first met with Holbrooke and team in Split in early August, (as I have conveyed on numerous ocassions previously), Holbrooke had spent most of our conversation pressing me to agree to a trade of Gorazde. Now, I have come to recognize this effort at a trade to be part of a broader “deal” reached with Milosevic and Mladic to cede to them the eastern enclaves/safe areas of Srebrenica, Zepa as well as Gorazde. However, after the evidence of the genocide that occurred at Srebrenica, they could no longer give Mladic a “yellow light” to simply create facts on the ground. Rather they would press us, the GOBiH (Government of Bosnia & Herzegovina), to make a trade. After our meeting in Split, Holbrooke avoided bringing up the subject in front of me. However, he kept pressing President Izetbegovic and others. “The Secret History of Dayton” confirms that the trade of Gorazde to satisfy Milosevic and Mladic was still a priority in August-September 1995: “US would seek to steer both parties toward a solution that would trade Gorazde for substantial Serb concessions.” (Page 67) Geneva As “The Secret History of Dayton” outlines, the Geneva meeting of Foreign Ministers - Granic, Milutinovic, Sacirbey – “The result of the meeting was supposed to be a forgone conclusion, as the three Balkan Presidents had already consented to the document.” (Page 96) … “To begin, Sacirbey threatened to derail the talks by calling from his hotel to announce that he would not attend the meeting.” (Page 97) This is not in “The Secret History of Dayton.” Actually I was not at the hotel (as I had flown in that morning) and was already at the US Embassy in Geneva but was on the telephone with President Izetbegovic reviewing the situation. Holbrooke tried to rush me, and undiplomatically walked into the room while I was still consulting with President Izetbegovic. In turn, I shoved Holbrooke out of the room with my body, and we exchanged angry words with him that brought the whole US Embassy to a halt. Holbrooke had been threatening to again halt the NATO strikes as well as to blame the Bosnians for reneging on their commitments and thus the failure of the “US peace initiative.” I was not any kinder to my assessment of his role but my immediate point was to tell him to get out of the room accorded to our BiH delegation for the day in the US Embassy. I then went back into the room to conclude my call with President Izetbegovic. Holbrooke had already agreed that the Bosnian Serbs (Koljevic) would not be allowed to make a statement nor even be seated at the table separately. Only Granic, Milutinovic and I would speak. Further, there would be no signatures but only an informal nod that the “Geneva Principles” would serve as basis for further negotiations. Nonetheless, the issue was whether I would at all seat myself at the table and even by my presence provide acquiescence. There would be no legal obligation or certainly international commitment; however both President Izetbegovic and I tried to evaluate BiH’s situation. President Izetbegovic asked me if I believed Holbrooke’s now more than implicit threats. I was not certain that he was bluffing. His ego was at stake, as well now the role of the United States. Holbrooke could do anything in retaliation for inflicting damage to that which was most important to him: image and ambition. Sarajevo would continue to be besieged and most likely partitioned. Gorazde would be allowed to fall. Choosing the Moment When to Call Bluff - Only After Sarajevo Free & Mladic's Army on the Run My view was that Holbrooke would try to execute his threat if only for his ego, and President Izetbegovic instructed me to not boycott the meeting . He was instructing me with the authority of the Presidency this was not just his suggestion nor was it inconsistent with my view of the risks at that moment. While it would be simple now to assess blame to President Izetbegovic for his agreement to “Republika Srpska” in Ankara a few days earlier, each part of the process provided the opportunity to assess and decide whether to move ahead or to stop, that is until the Accords were initialed in Dayton over 70 days later. During that period, NATO strikes continued until the siege was lifted and Mladic’s army was on the run and on the verge of collapse in Banja Luka. That is the time when we maybe should have called Holbrooke’s bluff. (See film report – conversation with David Harland – UN on Holbrooke’s purported “bluff” regarding Banja Luka - bosniatv.org/films/movie/fruits-of-genocide-srebrenica-to-prijedor/20091 ) Dayton Accords only Source of Legitimacy for Republika Srpska Now, back to where Republika Srpska has its source of legitimacy. It is only in the Dayton Accords. Further, the Dayton Accords nor status of RS does not affect the sovereignty, territorial integrity or international standing of BiH. (Moreover, when promoting the interests of Republika Srpska or its legitimacy, neither Belgrade nor Banja Luka leadership has not called upon the unsigned Geneva Principles). They always cite the Dayton Accords as the only document with legal status. During the 22 days of negotiations in Dayton, the RBiH and Federation of BiH delegation could have walked away from the talks at any time without Republika Srpska having been accorded any legal status. (The Geneva Principles would only serve as stepping stone to extent that in end Dayton Accords were actually signed - not signing Dayton made Geneva irrelevant). That delegation included: Presidency Chair and Members Alija Izetbegovic, Ivo Komsic, Miro Lazovic , PM Haris Silajdzic, Federation President Kreso Zubak, Fed. PM Jadranko Prlic and FM Muhamed Sacirbey, along with many legal and political advisers. Now Bosnia Does not Face the Same Risks as Then Back then, it can be argued that the threats to BiH and its citizens were so high that the risks could not be taken. Perhaps we could not afford to call Holbrooke’s bluff, perhaps. Regardless though of my own views then, my signature was fixed upon Dayton, along with that of our entire delegation. Now, the risks are neither the same in terms of threat to life of BiH citizens or existence of the country. Courage to Bosnian/Herzegovinian Leaders Some may feel personal pressures, intimidation, maybe even blackmail from the same international factors; however, I have withdrawn my signature for all the legal, ethical, and strategic reasons, (that I have previously reflected). Now, it does not require us to call a bluff with Sarajevo or Gorazde or the whole country at risk. It only requires courage and consistency of principles and politics. Mutually Beneficial Options with US & European "partners" Full texts at www.diplomaticallyincorrect.org & The European Courier - Over the next few weeks I will endeavour to more comprehensively relay critical events that have led to the construction and now collapse of the Dayton Accords. How to help shape a new BiH "partnership" with the US and EU, rather than current subservience. (This week, I am scheduled to speak at the Harriman Institute- Columbia University on "Dayton Accords Vision Inconsistent with European Perspective - the debilitating current co-dependency that perpetuates." In Geneva though, acting upon the instructions of President Izetbegovic, I did not differ in the fundamental assessment of risks - taking into account the siege and risks to Sarajevo and Gorazde, Mladic's still largely intact military (before resumption of NATO strikes), BiH's reliance upon US support as well as the "Ankara commitment" by Izetbegovic to Holbrooke - even as I would come to differ with President Izetbegovic on some key issues at Dayton and particularly during the 5 years after, during the consolidation. My differences though were as much with US officials, Holbrooke in particular, who I saw acting in an increasingly un-American manner while wielding US Government authority and to the detriment of Bosnia & Herzegovina, its citizens as well as American values -rule of law - to US long term strategic interests - a partnership with a pluralistic Muslim majority democratic state when such would serve mutual interests in multiplicative benefits and when global conditions most demanded. More related Film Reports at www.bosniatv.org -- By Ambassador Muhamed Sacirbey