Negotiating leverage is the primary consideration; (UN Security Council is expected to start consideration of Palestinian application submitted on Friday - 9/23/11), however all the rhetoric and brinkmanship from Israel, US, Palestinians and their supporters could make this significantly more dynamic and less controllable. If the Palestinians gain the attributes of a UN member state then they will be able from legal and diplomatic perspective to confront continuing Israeli hold on the "Occupied Lands" and particularly settlement activity. Israel's claim to such lands and activity would be in conflict with not merely a Palestinian people but an internationally recognized state. On the other hand, with the ambiguity of no formally recognized Palestinian state, Israel can press for territorial and other concessions. Such would be fashioned to legitimize Israel's hold on certain territories, perhaps water rights and other natural resources and also position on the "right of return" of Palestinians (who were made refugees by the establishment of Israel). After Application for UN Membership, What Next? Now that Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas has formally submitted the application for UN membership, (PHOTO Above - UN Membership application delivered to UN SG Ban Ki-moon as starting point), it is appropriate to dissect the rhetoric to its fundamental bargaining points. The UN Security Council and potentially the General Assembly will be consumed with the matter, and a call for a return to negotiations will not resolve. It is not negotiations that are at issue. Negotiations will be necessary under any circumstance to bring resolution. Rather, negotiations under which conditions - or more accurately in this diplomatic confrontation whether such talks would proceed before or after the Palestinians have realized their state rights and what they understand as more tenable bargaining leverage. Vesting of "Occupied Lands" in Palestinian State: Israel can now assert that such land, even if defined as "occupied," belonged to Jordan and not any Palestinian state since such did not exist at time of conquest and occupation. Even if most UN members and institutions recognize such land as in principle belonging to Palestinians (as Jordan has ceded its rights to the Palestinians as did Egypt with the Gaza Strip), the establishment of an internationally recognized Palestinian state would effectively vest such claim and significantly strengthen Palestinian bargaining power at any negotiations. Such lands would be seen from a legal perspective as more part of the territorial integrity and falling under sovereignty of the Palestinian state rather than something more ambiguous and perhaps subject to more equal competing claims. Right of Return: Also, Palestinian recognition of Israel as a "Jewish State" has implications beyond symbolism or semantics. If the Palestinians formally recognize Israel as exclusively a "Jewish State" than the right of Palestinian refugees to the land and any return may be diminished even as all Jews may become automatically citizens of Israel upon entry (even if they were not born and had never lived in the land). Enhancing Palestinian Legal Options & Negotiating Leverage: The Israeli and Palestinian statehood confrontation that now dominates the UN can be seen from the perspective of both sides as legitimate in developing the negotiating leverage of each. Unfortunately though, it has its own set of dynamics and high risks that goes beyond the immediate issue. From the Israeli perspective, the Palestinians could more readily petition the International Court of Justice or even International Criminal Court once an internationally recognized state. Efforts at civil disobedience and potentially military means to assert Palestinian control would pose the risk for Israel of being legally defined as invader, aggressor and/or other form of violator of international law. Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak, again who in my opinion has been more straightforward in defining such risks, probably sees this as the greatest risk to Israel's interests and ambitions. On the other hand, the Palestinians see the Israeli strategy of delay, frustrate and create new facts on the ground. (Ironically, it may have been Palestinians/Arabs a few decades earlier that believed time would play to their favor). Further, the Palestinians believe Israel would like to bargain with the Palestinian right to statehood as a chip to gain further territorial and other concessions. Of course, the Palestinians see their state as not legally or otherwise dependent upon Israel's agreement. Unlike in the case of South Sudan where the new state was carved out of the Republic of Sudan, the Palestine state's lands never were part of Israel,at least not in international context (but Jordan and Egypt or 1947 Palestine partition). Commentary by current Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netenyahu that he would eagerly walk hand in hand with the Palestinians to submit their UN membership application, but only once the "outstanding issues" between the two sides are negotiated away, only furthers the Palestinians unease as it appears that the current Israeli government is positioning itself as predecessor state with right of effective veto to their state. Potential for grave Miscalculation & Diversion: Again, the posturing to establish the most favorable negotiating leverage by each is understandable. However, the calculations of how to maximize negotiating leverage may prove misguided and in themselves deliver unpredictable new risks. The Palestinians have been engaged in the "negotiating process" for several decades now. They blame Israel largely for the failures (although in fairness successive Palestinian leaders have failed to grasp today's deal to only see a worse one on the table tomorrow). However, it is an objective assessment that this Israeli Government is in no hurry, perhaps counting on time and new "realities on the ground" to enhance its negotiating position. It also inevitably counts open Palestinian leaders bargaining away certain rights/positions in order to finally realize the objective of a Palestinian state. The problem with such strategy, setting aside any more subjective judgment of rights and wrongs: it implicitly depends on Palestinian frustration and effective capitulation. The Palestinians already feel as the weaker party in the negotiations because of Washington's favortism/bias. The end result could be a grave miscalculation, dangerous frustration manifesting itself in a resort to violence and time of Arab revolution/change reverting its focus again upon the Israeli/Palestinian conflict and the perceived injustices. Related FILM REPORT - "Israeli/Palestine State Debate-UN" - diplomaticallyincorrect.org/films/movie/israelpalestine-state-debateun/28639 Related ARTICLE - "Palestine Dominates Obama's UN Speech" - diplomaticallyincorrect.org/films/blog_post/palestine-dominates-obamas-un-speech-more-rhetoric-less-initiative-by-ambassador-mo/35303 By Ambassador Muhamed Sacirbey Facebook – Become a Fan at “Diplomatically Incorrect” Twitter – Follow us at DiplomaticallyX Previous ARTICLE – “Will Palestine Seat This Chair?” - diplomaticallyincorrect.org/films/blog_post/will-palestine-seat-this-chair-at-un-photo-tells-the-story-by-ambassador-mo/35254 ),