By early August 1995, the Clinton Administration opted to formally put Richard Holbrooke in charge of the new so-called “American initiative.” Richard had been already responsible for Bosnia & Herzegovina (BiH) and the region for a year at the State Department ever since he took over for Chuck Redman after the so-called “final map” on BiH had been rejected by Pale and Belgrade in the summer of 1994. There was not unanimity regarding Holbrooke’s role though. Tony Lake (currently Head of UNICEF) and Madeline Albright (then my colleague at the UN), had a different vision and style. Saw Myself as More American than Holbrooke: By August of 1995, I had become leery of Holbrooke’s disregard for substance and what I considered American values – it struck me that I was more American than he was by how my views of multi-ethnicity, pluralism and open society had shaped my worldview as compared to his. Madeleine Albright and I had shared many a day and evening at the UN Security Council during the lengthy debates and not just on BiH. She and I were both American immigrants who saw much more in the United States than mere personal opportunity for ambition. Effective Dealmaker, but with Full Weight of US Behind Him: Holbrooke had also worked on Wall Street, but he was not a very effective dealmaker, that is until he worked with the full political and military might and capacity of the US behind him. Then, he was relentless in trying to project such with extreme leverage and as something that was at his personal disposal, with the press of a button. That is a characteristic to be admired by most, including me. However, I was leery that it was also a danger in the hands of someone who I started to see as evermore motivated by personal ambition rather than what was good in terms of US, Euro-Atlantic or shared democratic-open society values. It was becoming evident that unlike Albright, who had come from the broader region and understood the fallacy and dangerous consequences of stereotyping with comments as: “they have been killing each other for hundreds of years,” Holbrooke employed such to justify his actions and perceived BiH and the region as his stage. And, he had clear ambitions to quickly move on to the political Broadway in Washington. Traveling the Lifeline of Sarajevo: Holbrooke was supposed to come to Sarajevo in early August of 1995 to brief President Izetbegovic, PM Haris Silajdzic, the rest of BiH leadership and myself on the so-called “American initiative.” Apparently though, he could not gain assurances from besieging Serbian forces to land at Sarajevo airport. Instead, I was dispatched by President Izetbegovic and the BiH leadership to go to Split, Croatia, where Holbrooke was to meet with President Tudjman – even more reason in some minds for BiH to be represented. We left in a three-car convoy during daylight over Mount Igman, through Mladic’s lines. It was a dangerous road and daylight only multiplied the risks. Many BiH citizens and officials had been targeted and killed on that road. UN and media had fared not much better in terms of being targeted on what had become not only the lifeline for Sarajevo connecting to the tunnel, but increasingly had been adopted by the “internationals” as their way in and out rather than pass through Serbian checkpoints besieging the city. (Only a few months earlier, Ejup Ganic and I had been targeted after a careless UNPROFOR had revealed our positions on the same road. We came down on foot. An innocent Bosnian woman was hit by one of the mortars targeting us – she did not survive the trip down to a medical facility). It was some comfort that I was accompanied by then US Ambassador John Menzies. In the end, we reached Split just as dusk was coming. Holbrooke was just concluding his meeting with Tudjman at an adjoining facility. However, rather than meet in a room/facility that perhaps could be compromised, we agreed to hold our discussions on the relatively small US State Department plane that had been placed at Holbrooke’s disposal. Perhaps 60-80 journalists crowded outside the plane, and I had no doubt based on conversation with couple of them that Holbrooke had arranged for this media caravan to follow and document what he saw as his soon to come diplomatic triumph. President Clinton in his book “My Life” described my expectations of the United States role and thus principles to be pursued in the context of the “American initiative:” "Holbrooke and his team landed in the Croatian coastal city of Split, where they briefed the Bosnian foreign minister, Muhamed Sacirbey, on our plans. Sacirbey was the eloquent public face of Bosnia on American television, a handsome, fit man who, as a student in the United States had been a starting football player at Tulane University. He had long sought greater American involvement in his beleaguered nation and was glad the hour had finally come." (page 668). Needless to say, I have been disappointed by the end of that meeting in Split and now looking back 16 + years later in the role and outcome Washington has been instrumental in delivering. Press Ahead for a “Deal” on Gorazde: Holbrooke had immediately pressed on me that we had to trade Gorazde. Although the leadership team in BiH had been in advance made aware of this pressure on Gorazde, it surprised me how persistent Holbrooke was on the matter. General Wesley Clark, Robert Frasure and John Kornblum were also on the plane, but remained silent as Holbrooke pressed his hand. Because we had discussed and I had received support from President Izetbegovic and the BiH leadership to resist any trade of Gorazde, I could call Holbrooke’s bluff. Nonetheless, it was both strange to me at the time and worrying that 75 minutes of a 1 ½ hour meeting Holbrooke had focused on gaining a concession on Gorazde from Sarajevo. Only some years after has it become clear that Holbrooke had promised Milosevic Gorazde as well as Srebrenica and Zepa – his bluff directed at me was part of his poker with Milosevic. Playing the Media & Thus Controlling the Players: Stranger at the moment was Holbrooke’s request of me as we were about to walk off the plane: “Mo, I want you to tell the reporters that I did not ask you to trade Gorazde.” Of course this was exactly the opposite, but it also revealed that he was concealing something else. At that time though my focus was how to remove Gorazde from the trading table. As we walked off the plane, Holbrooke looked to control the message to the eager media. Of course the message was optimism and praise directed at all. It was part of Holbrooke’s strategy with the press to position himself as the judge for media who was a good boy and who was not. Control the image of those that are sitting at the table with you and you can control them, and in his mind the “game.” The tactic though also would serve to lift him above the fray, and thus project him as somehow more noble and concerned for US interests or Bosnians/Herzegovinians then the rest at the table. At that moment though, as Holbrooke was speaking with the media, I was still calculating how to employ the moment for the one tangible result I hoped to achieve – take Gorazde off the table. I offered to the reporters with Holbrooke at my side that: “Ambassador Holbrooke has asked me to tell you that he did not ask me to trade Gorazde – Gorazde is off the table.” Saving Gorazde: A couple of weeks later, I had lunch with Ambassador Albright and her then chief assistant Jamie Rubin in Washington. They both could not contain their pleasure and amusement at what I then perceived as Holbrooke’s expense. Actually, what I have come to realize is that they also understood that Holbrooke had effectively committed to Milosevic the three enclaves – Srebrenica, Zepa and Gorazde. After the meeting and press conference in Split, they now knew that Holbrooke would have to disappoint Milosevic, at least on Gorazde but unfortunately late for Srebrenica and Zepa. Problem was Not History as Much as Those Who Would Exploit Ethnicity for Conflict: Albright understood that Milosevic was playing Holbrooke, and probably getting the better of him. Albright had lived as a young girl in Belgrade as the daughter of the Czechoslovak Ambassador. She spoke the language and was certainly not anti-Serb but pro-Balkan. She understood that nothing would substantively change for the region and BiH itself as long as Milosevic remained at the helm in Belgrade. While Holbrooke promoted Milosevic as the pillar of stability and viewed him as the appropriate partner, Albright saw him as one of the fundamental problems. (Albright and Rubin were not fans of the Dayton process, even if historical context and collegiality within Clinton Administration alumni might cause them to be less vocal in their criticism of the result, Holbrooke or the process itself). A few years later, Albright and General Clark would be in a position to deliver the end to Milosevic’s personal rule. Unfortunately, it happened over Kosovo and not earlier on BiH. BiH’s course had been defined from Washington on basis of Milosevic as a pillar and with personal ambitions as paramount - how ironic that US policy on BiH, a state committed to pluralism as the US, had been shaped by Holbrooke’s personality affinity on dealing with Milosevic. The next round was to be played out on NATO’s intervention in BiH. Part 1 - " Road to Dayton" - diplomaticallyincorrect.org/films/blog_post/the-road-to-dayton-by-ambassador-muhamed-sacirbey-part-1/41938 By Ambassador Muhamed Sacirbey Facebook – Become a Fan at “Bosnia TV” and/or “Diplomatically Incorrect” Twitter - Follow us at DiplomaticallyX “Srebrenica Genocide” Channel - diplomaticallyincorrect.org/c/the-genocide-of-srebrenica/most_recent/6